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JUDICIAL POWER TO VARY A CHAPTER X!
ARRANGEMENT AFTER CONFIRMATION:c
CHAPTER XI of the Bankruptcy Act 1 affords the small, closely-held bus-
iness enterprise 2 an opportunity for adjusting its unsecured debts 3 in a
speedy, economical proceeding. 4 Where a debtor can avail himself of an
arrangement under Chapter XI, he salvages the going-concern value of his
business and avoids the stigma of bankruptcy. Such a non-liquidation
settlement also preserves for business creditors a continuing outlet for their
products.
5
Theoretically, a creditor should receive as much from a Chapter XI
arrangement as he does from a bankruptcy liquidation.0 But the expeditious
* WVhiteford Plastics Co. v. The Chase National Bank of New York, 179 F2d 582 (2d
Cir. 1950).
1. Bankruptcy Act, §301-99, 52 STAT. 905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§701-99 (1946).
Citations to the Bankruptcy Act will hereafter refer only to the section number of the Act.
2. Statistics compiled on the basis of Chapter XI proceedings initiated in the District
of Connecticut and the Southern District of New York in a representative six-month period
indicate that the vast majority of arrangements involve small retail merchants and private
corporations with assets of less than $100,000. About 75% of those analyzed involved less
than $30,000. Comment, 51 YAtz LJ. 253, 280 (1941).
In SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940), 40 COL. L.
Rav. 1245, the Supreme Court held that if the debtor is a large corporation whose stock is
publicly held and the reorganization plan scales down unsecured debt without diminishing
or affecting stockholder interests, the corporation must file under Chapter X, even though
it may literally come within the provisions of Chapter XI. For a discussion of the rela-
tionship of Chapters X and XI, see Rostow & Cutler, Compcting Systcms of Corporate
Reorganization, 48 YALE L.J. 1334 (1939).
3. Section 306(1) provides that: "'Arrangement' shall mean any plan of a debtor
for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension of the time of payment of his unsecured debts,
upon any terms."
4. See Hearbs Before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 6439 (reintroduced and
adopted in 1938 as H.R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 36,37 (1937).
Results of a YALE LAw Joux.&A. survey indicated that on the average less than three
months elapsed between the filing of Chapter XI petition and confirmation. The cost of
administration ran from an average of 5% on estates above $25,000 to 8% for smaller
estates. Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 253,269 (1941).
5. Creditors usually prefer to forego full payment of their present claim in reliance
on future dealings with the debtor under more stringent credit terms. See Comment, 51
YALE I-. 253,274 (1941).
6. The Bankruptcy Act entitles creditors to all of the debtor's property which is ac-
cessible to them. Accordingly, § 366 specifies "the best interests of creditors" as one of
the conditions precedent to judicial confirmation of an arrangement. This test has been
interpreted as preventing the debtor from paying less than the property is worth. See
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and economical administration provided for by Chapter XI is obtained
only at the expense of creditor safeguards. The debtor is ordinarily retained
in possession, and is invested with the powers of a trustee.7 He enjoys a
strong bargaining position and controls every phase of the proceeding. 8 He
alone may propose a plan and offer modifications.9 Short of actual fraud,
no restrictions are placed on his representations in soliciting acceptances
Levin, Weintraub & Singer, Third Year of Arrangements under the Bankruptcy Act, 18
N.Y.U.L.Q. Rnv. 375, 386 (1941) ; 8 Couam ON BAN RUPTCY 1167, (14th ed. 1941).
Even on liquidation, the going-concern value of a business which the debtor retains
under Chapter XI, is not an asset available to creditors. The personality, skill, experience,
and good will of a debtor command a market price only where he covenants not to compete
with his purchaser. As such a covenant cannot be imposed by a bankruptcy court, creditors
lose nothing by permitting the debtor to retain such intangible property. Rostow & Cutler,
Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization, 48 YA.n L.J. 1334, 1358 (1939).
A Chapter XI arrangement may provide a greater recovery for creditors since the
estate is spared the expense of a trustee and his attorney whenever the debtor is retained
in possession. See note 7 infra. Cf. Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 253, 269 (1941), which lists
attorneys' fees as the largest single item of administration cost.
7. Section 342 provides that "where no receiver or trustee is appointed, the debtor
shall continue in possession of his property and shall have all the title and exercise all the
powers of a trustee appointed under this Act, subject, however, at all times to the control
of the court and to such limitations, restrictions, terms, and conditions as the court may
from time to time prescribe."
The debtor is retained in possession in the great majority of cases. Comment, 51 YA=
L.J. 253, 264 (1941). His powers are the same as those of any other trustee in bank-
ruptcy. In re Martin Custom Made Tires Corp, 108 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1939) (setting aside
of unrecorded conditional sales contract) ; In re Rand Mining Co., 71 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.
Cal. 1947) (invalidation of judicial lien); In re Janoff & Rosseth, CCH BANnit. LAW
REI'. (3d ed.) 54,429 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (turnover order) ; 8 CoLTERn oX BA1CuRr=cv
6.32 (14th ed. 1941).
8. Chapter XI proceedings are initiated by voluntary petitions. Sections 321, 322.
In practice -the debtor usually has the power to segregate claims into arbitrary classes
for the 'purpose of settlement. He can thus coerce creditors into acquiescence by promising
or threatening to place them into one class rather than another. While the division Is
subject to judicial scrutiny under the "fair and equitable" test (§ 366(3)), when the plan
comes up for confirmation, courts have frequently approved divisions which bore little
relation to administrative expediency. See Comments, 49 YALE L.J. 881 (1940), 51 YA=
L.J. 253, 271, 272 (1941).
The court may only confirm an arrangement if it was offered "in good faith," if it Is
"for the best interests of creditors," and if it is "fair, equitable, and feasible." Section 366.
But the efficacy of judicial scrutiny is weakened by the fact that the court does not pass on
the fairness of the plan until after acceptance by the requisite majority of creditors. At
that point, the court is faced with a fait accompli, and will frequently be inclined to give
presumptive weight to the creditor approval which the debtor can ordinarily secure with
the help of such devices as noted above. Cf. In re Polk's Model Hobbies, Inc., CCH BANi1a,
LAW REP. (3d ed.) 56,454 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); In re Romec Pump Co., 31 F. Supp, 389
(N.D. Ohio 1939). This occurs in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has declared
that creditor acceptance is irrelevant when determining the "fair and equitable" nature of




from poorly informed and frequently disorganized creditors." The latter
are confronted with the narrow alternative of assenting or objecting to the
arrangement. And their decision is influenced by awareness of the asset-
depleting effect of protracted administration.
_As the case of Whileford Pkslics Co. v. The Clxse National Bank of New
-York "1 illustrates, this emphasis on speed frequently results in the adoption
of a plan which does not reflect the best interests of creditors. In this case,
a vendor of machinery whose claim was secured by a conditional sales con-
tract assigned his security and the underlying debt to the Chase National
Bank. Chase neglected to record the contract until after the vendee-debtor
had proposed a Chapter XI arrangement and was appointed trustee by a
Bankruptcy Court. Failure to record the conditional sales contract rendered
the security void as against lien creditors under New York law.'12 But
believing Chase's lien to be valid, the debtor at first made no attempt to
use his power under Section 70c 13 nor did he include the value of the ma-
chinery in his proposed arrangement which called for payment of about ten
cents on the dollar. The arrangement was accepted by the requisite majority
in number and amount of the unsecured creditors. Sometime after creditor
acceptance, however, the debtor petitioned the court to invalidate the
lien. 14 While the petition was pending, the court confirmed the arrangement
as originally formulated and subsequently denied the debtor's petition.'
10. The Act specifies that at the first meeting of creditors, the court "shall receive and
determine the written acceptances of creditors on the proposed arrangement." Section 336.
This clearly contemplates that the plan, which must accompany the initial petition (§ 323)
shall have been considered by creditors prior to their first meeting. But an official creditors'
committee which can exert effective supervision is ordinarily not appointed until the first
creditors' meeting. Section 338. Unofficial creditors' committees, functioning prior to the
first meeting, are hampered by the decision in Lane v. Haytian Corporation of America,
117 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1941), which denied compensation for expenses incurred by creditors
prior to the appointment of the official committee. See Montgomery, The Chandler Act
Again: Two Criticisms, 25 VA. L. Rnv. 881, 884 (1939).
11. 179 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1950).
12. N.Y. PEns. PROP. LAW §§ 64, 65.
13. "The trustee, as to all property in the possession.., of the bankrupt at the date
of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of the date of bankruptcy with all the rights,
remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon...."
14. The reason why the debtor instituted suit at this time is not clear. Chase main-
tained that the debtor, relying on judicial reluctance to increase the creditors' share after
confirmation, intended to invalidate the bank's security purely for his own benefit. Brief for
Appellee, p. 2, Vhiteford Plastics Co. v. The Chase National Bank of New York, 179 F2d
582 (2d Cir. 1950). That position was accepted by the referee and the district judge.
Transcript of Record, pp. 15, 21, Whiteford Plastics Co. v. The Chase National Bank of
New York, 4upra.
15. Whiteford Plastics Co. v. The Chase National Bank of New York, No. 85,533
S.D.N.Y., Dec. 7,1948.
The suit would have been allowed if the debtor at any time prior to confirmation had
proposed an amendment to the plan ( 363) which would have permitted the court to retain
jurisdiction after confirmation (§ 368) for the purpose of ordering an additional disburse-
1950l-
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial in a 2-1
decision. The court reasoned that as between vendor and vendee the con-
ditional sales contract was valid. The security could only be voided for the
benefit of general creditors. But any recovery on the petition would inure
not to them but to the debtor since the creditors' share in the estate was
limited by the plan which they had approved and which the court had cot-
firmed. And even if the creditors were not estopped by their failure to object
and their rights were not abated by confirmation, the majority felt that a
Bankruptcy Court was powerless to decree the additional distribution of a
post-confirmation dividend to creditors.
A consideration of the background and function of Chapter XI leads to
the conclusion that the court was mistaken both in limiting creditors to the
benefits of their bargain, and in disclaiming the power to distribute among
them whatever funds the debtor's suit might bring into the estate.
If a Chapter XI arrangement were akin to a common law composition,
there might be some validity in the court's position that the creditors were
estopped by their acceptance of the plan.16 However, several points in the
mechanics of Chapter XI emphasize the inappropriateness of contract
doctrine. In contrast to a composition there is a provision for the coercion of
minority creditors. 17 Furthermore, acceptance of a chapter XI arrangement
does not of itself fix a creditor's rights. The plan does not become effective
unless accepted by a majority in number and amount of the creditors and
ment out of whatever funds his avoiding action might recover for the estate. As such a
modification would not have "materially and adversely affected the interest of any creditor"
in the arrangement (§ 364), the debtor need not have given notice to all parties in interest
and the amendment would not have delayed confirmation of the plan.
16. The historic derivation of Chapter XI from the common law composition agree-
ment is responsible for the injection of contract tenets into this area of the law. Coinposi-
tions, being voluntary debt-adjusting settlements between a debtor and two or more
creditors, are of course governed by principles of contract. In re Clarence A. Nachman
Co., 6 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1925). Compositions were brought into the bankruptcy law
by the amendment of 1874 to the Act of 1867. 18 STAT. 182 (1874). They were taken over
into the Act of 1898 as §§ 12 and 13, 30 STAT. 549, 550 (1898). For the early history of coin-
positions in bankruptcy, see MooRE's BANKcRUPTCY MANUAL, 636-8 (1939); Hanna, Con-
temporary Utility of General Assignments, 35 VA. L. Rav. 539, 551-4 (1949). The wholly
voluntary initiation of proceedings, the retention of the terms "compositions" and "exten-
sions," and perhaps the drag of inertia induced most courts dealing with § 12 proceed-
ings to retain the composition analogy. See Myers v. International Trust Co,, 273
U.S. 380, 383 (1927) ; In re Realty Associates Securities Corp., 69 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir.
1934) ; In re Lane, 125 Fed. 772 (D. Mass. 1902). But cf. In re Hammohi, 12 F. Supp, 228
(N.D. Cal. 1935).
Chapter XI superseded §§ 12 and 13 in 1938. The word "arrangement" was substituted
for the old terms "composition" and "extension." The contract analogy, never apt even
under § 12, is still less so under Chapter XI which grafted some additional provisions for
creditor safeguards and judicial supervision onto the statute. See MooRE's BANKRUPTCY
MANUAL 639, 645-8 (1939). But see In re Vulcan & Reiter Co., 80 F. Supp, 286




subsequently confirmed by the court.'9 Confirmation is not automatic but is
predicated on a judical finding that the plan is fair, equitable, feasible and
in the best interests of creditors." And until confirmation, an acceptance
is revocable."
Nor was the debtor's petition barred by an inherent lack of power to
modify the plan after confirmation. The court felt that it was limited by
Section 386 of the Bankruptcy Act which specified fraud as the only ground
for setting aside the confirmation of an arrangement.2 1 This provision con-
templates full reinstatement of the proceedings and, where the fraud is the
debtor's, liquidation in bankruptcy.22 Because of the attendant expense and
delay, 2" this section is restricted to instances of culpable defection by parties
in interest.
24
Although no fraud was alleged in this case, the court still had the power,
without technically "setting aside" the confirmation, to grant such incidental
18. Sections 362 and 367.
19. Section 366. See note S supra.
20. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy 499-501 (14th ed. 1941). But sce In re Conway, 39 F.
Supp. 172 (D.N.J. 1941) (creditors must present a "valid ground" on which to base a
right of rescission). Courts have uniformly refused to allow an individual creditor to
rescind his acceptance of a common law composition for anything short of an actual mis-
take in the factum. Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N.Y. 55 (1878) ; Johnson v. Parker, 34
Wis. 596 (1874).
21. The introductory clause of §386 specifies three conditions precedent to setting
aside the confirmation: (1) the petition to set aside must be filed within six months of con-
firmation, (2) fraud must have been practiced in the procuring of the arrangement, and
(3) knowledge of such fraud must have come to the petitioners since confirmation.
22. Section 386(1). Where the fraud is not attributable to the debtor, relief is avail-
able only under sub-sections (2) and (3) of § 386. Under clause (2), the confirmation
is set aside, and the court hears applications for leave to propose modifications of the
arrangement "for the purpose of correcting the fraud." That subsection envisions the
eventual confirmation of the modified plan. Under clause (3), the court reinstates the
proceeding and modifies the arrangement without technically setting aside the confirma-
tion. Such alteration may not, however, prejudice third parties who have acquired rights
subsequent to and in reliance on confirmation. 8 COLLiER oN BAXKRUPrcy il 11.01-4
(14th ed. 1941). While the proceedings under subsection (3) are the least complex
contemplated by § 386, they still effect a detrimental change in the position of the debtor
and/or the creditors taking under the assignment. Cf. Levenson v. B. & If. Furniture
Co., 120 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1941).
23. When confirmation is set aside, the proceedings start substantially from the be-
ginning. Section 64a(3) gives priority to the reasonable costs of a creditor in obtaining
the setting aside of confirmation and § 64b gives priority to post-confirmation debts if
the confirmation is set aside. 8 CoLLmiR ON BANKRUP"CY 1481, 1482 (14th ed. 1941).
The trustee may recover sums paid out to creditors under the prior arrangement. In re
Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co., 73 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1934).
24. While one treatise insists that the confirmation may be vacated on grounds
other than fraud if justice requires it, 8 CoLLimR ox BANKRuprcy 1465, 1466 (14th ed.
1941), the cases have rigorously insisted on the requirement of fraud. In re Isidor Klein,
22 F2d 906, 908 (2d Cir. 1927) (decided under former § 13) ; In re Siff, 295 Fed. 761
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) (decided under former § 13). See In re Mirkus, 289 Fed. 732, 734 (2d
Cir. 1923).
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relief as is within the ordinary cognizance of a court of equity. 5 As indicated
by Judge Clark in his dissent, the Bankruptcy Court had the power to in-
validate the lien' on the property here involved, to relegate the bank to its
pro-rata share of the debtor's estate, and to decree that the remainder of the
recovered fund be distributed ratably among the unsecured creditors. 2 A
Bankruptcy Court may reopen estates for cause shown and, a forliori,
may amend and supplement its decrees where, as here, the estate had not
been finally closed at the time of the debtor's petition.Y It sits continuously;
it is not limited by the rule which deprives other courts of equity of the
power to alter their decrees after expiration of the term at which the orders
were entered.2
Even though a Bankruptcy Court has the power to consider a tardy
petition, it should not make use of it in every case. Indiscriminate dispen-
sation of post-confirmation relief may neutralize the advantage of speedy
settlement which a Chapter XI arrangement offers. Trhus the court should
consider whether the petition will give rise to a vexatious suit which will bur-
den the estate with heavy costs or unreasonably delay final disposition.2"
The petition should also be denied if it would prejudice the rights of third
parties who have relied on the plan.20 However, in the absence of counter-
25. A barikruptcy court has continuous power to modify its own order if no inter-
vening rights are disturbed. See Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300
U.S. 131, 137 (1937). Cf. Federal Land Bank of Springfield v. Hansen, 113 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1940).
26. Judicial post-confirmation orders have covered a broad range of subjects. Coin-
mercial Wholesalers, Inc. v. Investors' Commercial Corp., 172 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1949)
(modification of final decree closing the estate) ; Grand Union Equipment Co. v. Lippner,
167 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1948) (court modified injunction to enable creditor to recover
judgment against debtor as preliminary step to taking recourse against debtor's insurer) ;
Mullican v. Texas Land and Mortgage Co., 117 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1941), rehcaring
denied, 118 F.2d 560 (reexamination of usurious claim; court construed referee's failure
to dismiss the case as a retention of jurisdiction) ; In re H. H. Buggie & Co., 18 US.L,
WEEK 2372 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 19, 1950) (creditor failed to file claim till after confirma-
tion but was permitted to share pro-rata as debtor had scheduled creditor's claim).
27. "The case is dismissed" upon confirmation (§367(4)) but the "estate is not
closed" until a decree to that effect is entered "upon the consummation of an arrange-
ment... ." Section 372. Until the estate is closed, the case remains open for the exercise
of all jurisdiction proper in bankruptcy proceedings. In re Rubin's Department Store, 75
F.2d 731, 732, 733 (7th Cir. 1935).
In the present case, no decree closing the estate had been entered at the time the
debtor's petition came up for hearing. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from
Counsel for the debtor-appellant, dated February 20, 1950, in the Yale Law Library. But
even if the estate had been formally closed, it could have been reopened "for cause
shown." Section 2a (8). That clause of § 2a (8) is applicable to Chapter XI proceedings.
8 Coi~m oN BANxRUPTCY 1280 n.9 (14th ed. 1941).
28. Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131 (1937).
29. See In re Polly Frocks, CCH BANKR. LAW REP. (3d ed.) 1 54, 260 (S.D.N.Y,
1942).
30. See Mohawk Realty Corp. v. Wise Shoe Stores, 111 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1940).
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